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I. Introduction
Uncertainty is generally viewed as a “bad”. For instance, severe uncertainty affecting future
environmental damages often raises the possibility of an environmental catastrophe. In this
paper, we show that uncertainty may have a positive impact in a context of global pollution.
Uncertainty can lower the incentives to pollute and make risk-averse polluters better-off.
This result may have implications for the climate change debate. The recent (and disputed)
Stern review states that “climate change will reduce welfare by an amount equivalent to a re-
duction in consumption per head of between 5 and 20%” (Stern et al., 2007, p. 10, Executive
Summary). This represents a considerable negative impact of the climatic damage. And it also
represents a considerable uncertainty about this impact.1 Moreover, there still do not exist bind-
ing international cooperation mechanisms to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, as the Kyoto
protocol has failed to involve some of the biggest pollution emitters including the United States.2
Therefore, incentives to free-ride on emissions reduction remain for some (if not most) countries.
In such a strategic global pollution context, our paper suggests that the large persistent uncer-
tainty about future climate damage impacts need not be detrimental for overall welfare in our
economies.
This result has an intuitive explanation. As in many other settings, economic agents tend
to lower their risk-averting efforts when uncertainty is reduced.3 In our model, the variance of
damage increases with pollution. Polluters can reduce the risk faced by decreasing their own
emissions. While this action is taken from a purely individual point of view, it has positive social
consequences. It tends to alleviate the negative externality. Welfare may even be higher under
uncertainty than under certainty when the positive effect of reduced emissions is larger than the
negative effect of uncertainty. Similar effects have been documented in other contexts, but they
appear to have been overlooked in studies of global pollution.4
1 In his critical review, Weitzman (2007) spells out different arguments that reinforce the importance of uncer-
tainty in the discussion on climate change. Climate science indicates that large scientific uncertainties about global
warming impacts persist. For example, current estimates predict a 90% chance of global warming at the end of the
century lying between 1.1◦ and 6.4◦ (IPCC, 2007, p. 13, Summary for Policymakers).
2Also, other big emitters like China or India have ratified the protocol but are not required to reduce emissions.
3Such substitution effects engender moral hazard in insurance situation, for instance when holders of fire insur-
ance take less preventive actions to reduce the risk of fire; see Arrow (1963) for an early reference.
4For instance, Peltzman (1975) argues that mandating safety belts in cars makes people drive more recklessly
and the number of fatal accidents may rise as a result. Similarly, Viscusi (1984) emphasizes a “lulling effect” in
which child-resistant bottlecaps did not have the expected positive effects in reducing child poisenings possibly due
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These two features - strategic interactions and uncertainty - play a central role in most global
commons situations, such as climate change.5 Each feature has been extensively studied by
economists, but they are usually considered separately.6 In this paper, we look at their combined
effect. We study a simple model where agents’ actions impose a negative externality on others
and the damage from this externality is subject to uncertainty.7 We ask whether uncertainty
alleviates or aggravates the negative externality.
We develop our analysis in four parts. We first set up a symmetric game of global pollution
under uncertainty, and establish some basic properties of the equilibria. A unique symmetric
equilibrium often exists, but asymmetric equilibria may also appear. Second, we look at the
effect of uncertainty and risk-aversion on emissions and welfare. We find that emissions are
always lower under uncertainty than under certainty. We characterize for small risks when this
leads to an increase in welfare. This result and further numerical simulations show that, indeed,
welfare is often higher under uncertainty. We then study the effects of an increase in risk and an
increase in risk-aversion. Previous insights extend with some qualifications. Third, we look at
risk heterogeneity. Being the only agent to face uncertainty is a large disadvantage in equilibrium.
This outcome is reversed under cooperation. And fourth, we study alternative formulations of
our game. We find that our main results hold under different assumptions, including uncertain
benefits and two periods.
Few other papers have examined the effect of uncertainty in a strategic context. Gradstein
et al. (1992) argue that the comparative statics of uncertainty are generally ambiguous. Sandler
and Sterbenz (1990) look at the exploitation of a stock resource, and show that uncertainty on the
size of the stock leads risk-averse firms to reduce their exploitation effort compared to certainty;
see also Sandler et al. (1987). More recently, Eso and White (2004) introduces uncertainty
in auctions and White (2004) introduces uncertainty in a Rubinstein bargaining model. Both
to a reduction in parental caution. See also Viscusi (1994).
5Other prominent examples include the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the prevention and containment of
new diseases outbreaks, management of fish stocks, and the production of scientific knowledge, see Barrett (2007).
6Experts identified five main qualitative features to the problem of climate change, see IPCC (1995). Strategic
interactions and uncertainty constitute two of these features. The remaining three are the asymmetric distribution
of impacts, the long time horizon, and potential irreversibilities. We briefly discuss these issues in section V.
7Our paper is related to two branches of the literature on negative externalities. First, some papers have
examined (usually numerically) the effect of learning on non-cooperative emissions (Hammitt and Adams, 1996;
Ulph and Ulph, 1996; Ulph and Maddison, 1997; Baker, 2005). Second, other papers have studied the effect of
uncertainty and learning on international environmental agreements (Na and Shin, 1998; Ulph, 2004; Kolstad,
2005; Boucher and Bramoullé, 2007).
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papers study the effect of uncertainty on decisions and welfare and show that uncertainty may
be beneficial for risk-averse players. Our paper complements these studies. We provide the first
analysis of the effect of uncertainty and risk-aversion on global pollution.8
Our model relies on two main assumptions. We discuss their plausibility in the context of
our lead example, climate change. First, we assume that the variance of damage is increasing
in overall pollution. This assumption is very likely satisfied in the case of climate change. For
instance, Table 1 presents current scientific predictions on the effects of the atmospheric level of
CO2 on global mean temperature at equilibrium. Clearly as the level of CO2 rises, the range of
predicted values expands. In turn, economic damage and its variance are expected to increase
with mean temperature.9 Thus, more CO2 emissions likely lead to greater and riskier damages.
Insert Table 1 about here
Our second main assumptions is that polluters, such as countries in a climate change setting,
are risk-averse. This may seem more controversial. Economists often view countries as risk-
neutral, due to their sizes and to the possibility to pool independent risks across the population
(Arrow and Lind, 1970). However, the unique features of climate change challenge this view. Risk-
sharing opportunities are limited due to the high correlation of climate risks within communities.
And potential damages are large, involving a sizable portion of the economies even in conservative
estimates. Thus, Heal and Kriström (2002) recommend to better account for uncertainty and
risk-aversion in the economic approach to climate change.10 In the same vein, economists working
on integrated assessment models usually assume risk-aversion, see e.g. Nordhaus (1994) and Stern
et al. (2007). However, these models generally neglect the externality dimension, which plays a
central role here.
8Eso and White (2004) consider an additive risk which is contingent on the outcome of the game. It is only faced
by the agent who wins the auction. White (2004) considers both additive and mutliplicative risks in a two-player
setting. In contrast, in our game, the risk is multiplicative and faced by all agents. We study additive risks in
section V.
9See e.g. Figure 6.6 (p. 195) and Table 13.2 (p. 295) in Stern et al. (2007). See also Figure 1 in Azar and
Rodhe (1997).
10 “The point is that uncertainty, risk and our attitudes towards risk really do matter in making policy decisions.
They should be taken explicitly into account in formulating policy on climate change. Our final policy analysis
may be as sensitive to attitudes towards risk as to some aspects of the scientific data which we work so hard to
generate. Yet we have done little to introduce these issues into the policy debate.” Heal and Kriström (2002, p.
16).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce the model of
global pollution under uncertainty, and examine its basic properties. In section III, we look at
the effect of uncertainty and risk-aversion on emissions and welfare. In section IV, we study risk
heterogeneity. We consider extensions in section V, and conclude in section VI.
II. Model and Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we introduce our model of global pollution under uncertainty, and derive some
properties of the equilibria. Consider the following n-player game with n ≥ 2. Each agent (or
country) i emits a level of pollution ei ≥ 0. Agents benefit from emitting pollution, but suffer from
the global level of pollution
Pn
j=1 ej . The damage arising from pollution is uncertain, subject
to a risk θ˜i > 0. We focus here on situations where individual risks are ex-ante identical.11
For instance, damage may be the same for everybody, eθi = eθ or individual damages eθi may be
identically and independently distributed.12 This assumption allows us to write θ˜i = θ˜ in our
payoff formulation below. Let θ¯ denote the expected value of the risk θ˜.
We make the following assumptions regarding the benefits and costs of pollution. First, the
benefits are simply equal to ei in any state of nature. That is, benefits from polluting are not
affected by uncertainty, and the individual level of pollution emission is identified with its mon-
etary value.13 Second, the risk is multiplicative. There exists a damage function d such that the
individual damage from pollution is equal to θ˜d(
Pn
j=1 ej). This function is increasing d
0 > 0,
convex d00 ≥ 0 and satisfies d(0) = 0, d0(0) < 1/θ¯, and lime→+∞ d0(e) = +∞. Finally, agents have
identical risk preferences represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u, which is
increasing u0 > 0 and concave u00 ≤ 0. Agent i’s expected utility is thus equal to
Eθ˜u(ei − θ˜d(
nX
j=1
ej)) (II.1)
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the analysis of this game. We focus on pure strategies,
and will notably look at welfare in equilibrium. We adopt a simple approach. Since our game is
11This assumption is relaxed in section IV.
12Another example is when one and only one individual can be affected by the total damage, but this individual
is unknown ex-ante.
13We consider uncertain benefits in section V.
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symmetric, we define welfare as the sum of the expected utilities of the agents. For a symmetric
profile where everyone pollutes e, this yields:
W (e) = nEθ˜u(e− θ˜d(ne))
Our assumptions imply that welfare is a concave function of e, and that expected utility (II.1) is
a concave function of ei. Thus, an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium where everyone emits e
is characterized by the following equation:
Eθ˜(1− θ˜d
0(ne))u0(e− θ˜d(ne)) = 0 (II.2)
At the equilibrium, agents set their emissions to equalize their expected marginal benefits from
pollution Eθ˜u
0(e − θ˜d(ne)) to their expected private marginal damage Eθ˜θ˜d0(ne)u0(e − θ˜d(ne)).
They do not account for the effect of their emissions on others. Private marginal damage is n
times lower than social marginal damage, and there is overpollution at the equilibrium.
We next study equilibrium existence, symmetry, and unicity. Our findings will allow us to
focus on symmetric interior Nash equilibria in our main analysis.14 We first show that existence
is indeed guaranteed.
Proposition 1. An interior symmetric equilibrium always exists.
This result relies on the properties of marginal damage at extreme values. Since marginal
damage is relatively low at low pollution levels, agents have some incentive to pollute. On the
other hand marginal damage becomes arbitrarily large with pollution, hence the incentive to
pollute is bounded. We next look at the shape of equilibria. The game being symmetric, we
expect equilibria to be symmetric as well, although this is by no means guaranteed. Our next
result shows that the outcome actually depends on the curvature of the utility function. Recall,
utility function u satisfies Decreasing (Constant, Increasing) Absolute Risk Aversion, or DARA
(CARA, IARA), if the level of risk aversion −u00/u0 is decreasing (constant, increasing).
Proposition 2. When u satisfies DARA or IARA, any interior equilibrium is symmetric. When
u satisfies CARA, asymmetric equilibria exist.
14An equilibrium (e1, ..., en) is interior if ∀i, ei > 0.
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Interior equilibria are indeed symmetric when the level of risk aversion is monotonic. This
does not hold for CARA utility functions, however. Due to the absence of income effect, the
equilibrium conditions under CARA turn out to be invariant to redistributions of global pollution
across agents. Under CARA, given some equilibrium, any profile with the same level of overall
pollution is also an equilibrium. To prove Proposition 2, we apply the diffidence theorem on
appropriate reformulations of the equilibrium conditions (Gollier, 2001). We make use of similar
techniques to prove our third result on unicity.
Proposition 3. When u satisfies DARA or CARA, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Taken together, these results imply that when the utility function is DARA there exists
a unique interior equilibrium, which is symmetric. As a consequence, we focus on symmetric
equilibria in what follows. We assume that equation (II.2) has a unique solution, that we denote
by eN .
III. Effects of uncertainty and risk aversion
A. Comparison with certainty and risk neutrality
Our main objectives is to study the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on emissions and
welfare in equilibrium. We first look at the natural benchmarks of certainty and risk neutrality.
In our model, the curvature of u only captures risk aversion motives. Uncertainty does not affect
risk neutral agents’ emissions and the emissions of risk averse agents under certainty are identical
to the emissions of risk neutral agents. When damage is certain or when agents are risk neutral,
condition (II.2) becomes
1− θ¯d0(ne) = 0
Denote by e¯N the corresponding emission level. Our next result compares this benchmark with
the general case of uncertainty.
Proposition 4. Emissions under uncertainty are lower than under certainty: eN ≤ e¯N .
Consistent with the remark above, this proposition also implies that emissions are lower under
risk aversion than under risk neutrality. We provide some intuition for this result. Consider a
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change from θ¯ to θ˜. Suppose first that others’ emissions do not change:
P
j 6=i ej = (n − 1)e¯N .
Under uncertainty, agent i’s payoff is equal to:
πi = ei − θ˜d(ei + (n− 1)e¯N).
Agent i should emit e¯N if he wants to maximize the expected value of his payoff Eθ˜πi = ei−θ¯d(ei+
(n− 1)e¯N ). Thus, decreasing ei with respect to this benchmark leads to a reduction in expected
payoffs. On the other hand, it also reduces the payoff’s variance var(πi) = var(θ˜)d2(ei+(n−1)e¯N ).
Lowering emissions acts as a form of insurance here. Assuming others’ emissions are fixed,
reducing emissions trades-off a loss in expected payoff for a reduction in risk. The emissions of
others are not fixed, however. They care about uncertainty, and also react to each other’s actions.
Strategic effects could especially lead some agents to increase their own emissions as a response
to a decrease in others’ emissions. In our setting, we are able to show that these strategic effects
are dominated. The reason is that the whole best-response functions are lower under uncertainty.
Thus, their intersection with the 45 degree line, which determines the symmetric equilibrium, is
also lower.
A key implication of this result is that welfare may be higher under uncertainty. To see
why, denote by W¯ (e) = nu(e− θ¯d(ne)) welfare under certainty. Compare the levels of welfare in
equilibrium under uncertainty W (eN) and under certainty W¯ (e¯N ). Their difference is the sum of
two terms:
W (eN )− W¯ (e¯N) = [W (eN )−W (e¯N )] + [W (e¯N)− W¯ (e¯N)]
Uncertainty has two effects, as captured by the two bracketed terms of the right hand side of this
equality. It leads to a decrease in emissions, holding the risk fixed (first term), and it changes the
risk faced, holding pollution emissions fixed (second term). The first term represents the strategic
effect and is positive by Proposition 4, concavity of W , and the fact that W 0(eN) < 0.15 The
second term represents the risk aversion effect and is negative by concavity of u and Jensen’s
inequality. The overall effect is ambiguous. Uncertainty may be socially beneficial, if the indirect
positive effect of reduced emissions is greater than the direct negative effect of uncertainty.
15Using condition (II.2), it is easy to see that W 0(eN ) = −n(n− 1)d0(neN )Eθ˜ θ˜u0(eN − θ˜d(neN )) < 0.
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We next obtain conditions under which uncertainty yields higher welfare for small risks. Sup-
pose here that θ˜ = θ¯+kε˜, with Eε˜ = 0. A small risk corresponds to a small value of k. Introduce
an indice Id measuring variations in the curvature of the damage function.
Id = (
d
d0
)0
Using Taylor approximations, we can show that this indice determines the effect of uncertainty
on welfare for small risks.
Proposition 5. If Id > (<)− n−2n and the risk is small enough, uncertainty increases (decreases)
welfare compared to certainty, W (eN ) > (<)W¯ (e¯N).
Welfare is thus higher under uncertainty for any small enough risk and for any risk averse
utility, as soon as Id is not too negative. This condition is always satisfied if, for instance, d has
constant elasticity.16 Interestingly, the condition does not depend on the shape of u, as long as u is
increasing and concave. Computations in the Appendix make clear, however, that the magnitude
of the effects is affected by u. Another noteworthy feature of Proposition 5 is that a higher n
makes a positive effect of uncertainty on welfare more likely. An increase in the number of agents
exacerbates free-riding, which increases the relative importance of the decrease in emissions in
the welfare comparison.
Overall, this section showed that emissions are lower under uncertainty than under certainty,
and that welfare may be higher. In the next two sections, we try to go further than this benchmark
comparison.
B. Increase in risk
We first look at the effect of an increase in risk. That is, we compare outcomes for a risk θ˜ and for
a risk z˜ that is more uncertain in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). To emphasize this
focus in what follows, we denote by eN(eθ) the emission level at the symmetric equilibrium under
the risk θ˜. Comparative statics with respect to the level of risk turn out to be ambiguous and to
involve properties of the third derivative of the utility function.17 We present three partial results
16Suppose that d(e) = d0eα with α ≥ 1. Then Id = 1/α > 0.
17These features are consistent with earlier findings in models with a single decision maker (Hadar and Seo, 1990;
Gollier, 2001).
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here. First, we provide an informal analysis of what happens for small damages. This illustrates
the emergence of effects related to prudence that tend to increase emissions. Second, we show
that an increase in risk always leads to a decrease in emissions in the absence of prudence. Third,
we show that an increase in risk also leads to a decrease in emissions for a natural class of binary
risks.
Suppose first that d is small. We can approximate agent i’s utility as follows.
u(ei − θd(ei + e−i)) ≈ u(ei)− θd(ei + e−i)u0(ei) +
1
2
θ2d(ei + e−i)
2u00(ei)
Rewrite equation (II.2) as Eθ˜f(e, θ˜) = 0 and consider an increase in risk from θ˜ to z˜. The previous
approximation leads to:
Ez˜f(e, z˜)−Eθ˜f(e, θ˜) =
1
2
(Ez˜ z˜2 −Eθ˜θ˜
2
)[2d(ne)d0(ne)u00(e) + d2(ne)u000(e)]
Since Ez˜ z˜2 ≥ Eθ˜θ˜
2
, the effect of an increase in risk on emissions is controlled by the sign of
2d(ne)d0(ne)u00(e)+d2(ne)u000(e). If this sign is negative, Ez˜f(e, z˜) lies everywhere belowEθ˜f(e, θ˜),
which means that eN (z˜) ≤ eN(θ˜). The opposite happens if the sign is positive. This expression is
the sum of two terms. The first term 2d(ne)d0(ne)u00(e) is always negative under risk aversion. This
part captures the effect highlighted in Proposition 4. Greater uncertainty increases the damage’s
variance. To compensate, risk averse agents have an incentive to reduce their emissions. In
contrast, the second term d2(ne)u000(e) represents a new effect. Following Kimball (1990), agents
are said to be prudent when u000 ≥ 0. Under prudence, the marginal value of an extra unit of
emissions e is higher when uncertainty is greater.18 Prudent agents have thus an incentive to
increase their emissions when they face more uncertainty. By polluting more, agents are able to
increase the risk-free portion of their payoff. Overall, the impact is ambiguous and depends on
which effect dominates. This opposition between risk aversion and prudence motives holds more
generally.
Our next result confirms, albeit negatively, the role played by prudence. We show that in the
absence of prudence, emissions always decrease when the level of risk increases.
18Formally, prudence implies that Ez˜u0(e− z˜d(ne)) ≥ Eθ˜u0(e− θ˜d(ne)).
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Proposition 6. Consider an increase in risk from θ˜ to z˜. Suppose that u000 = 0. Then, for any
damage function d, an increase in risk leads to lower emissions, eN(z˜) ≤ eN (θ˜).
There are two ways to obtain non-ambiguous comparative statics here. First, as done in
the previous result, we can restrict preferences and look for results valid for any increase in
risk. Alternatively, we can study specific risks, and look for results valid for any risk averse
utility functions. We illustrate this approach next. We introduce and define catastrophic risks
as follows. Damages may only be low or high (a catastrophe occurs). We denote by θL the risk
associated with low damages, by θ¯ the expected value of the risk, and by 1/k (with k > 1) the
catastrophe’s probability. Thus, θ˜ is equal to θL with probability 1− 1k and to θL+k(θ¯−θL) with
probability 1/k. We define an increase in catastrophic risk as an increase in k, holding θL and θ¯
constant. An increase in catastrophic risk is a particular case of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s increase
in uncertainty. As k increases, the catastrophe becomes less probable but more damaging. We
obtain the following result.
Proposition 7. For any utility function u and damage function d, an increase in catastrophic
risk leads to lower emissions.
Thus, prudence effects are dominated for catastrophic risks. In this case, as in all cases where
an increase in risk leads to lower emissions, our previous welfare analysis carries over.19 An
increase in risk may increase welfare if the indirect positive effect of reduced emissions is greater
than the direct negative effect. We present some numerical results to further illustrate these
effects. In our simulations, we assume that the utility function satisfies Constant Relative Risk
Aversion: u(π) = (π0 + π)1−γ/(1− γ) if γ 6= 1 and ln(π0 + π) if γ = 1 with π0 = 10. Damage is
quadratic d(e) = 12e
2. The risk is catastrophic, with θL = 1 and θ¯ = 2. We consider increases in k
ranging from 2 to 82 by increments of 10. We suppose that n = 2 and look at three values for the
coefficient of relative risk aversion: γ = 1/2, 1, and 2. Figure 1 describes the level of emission in
equilibrium as a function of the level of risk. Observe that here emission under certainty is equal
to 0.25. We see that emission is always lower than under certainty, and decreases as the level of
risk increases, which is consistent with Propositions 4 and 7. Emission is also lower when risk
19 In contrast, if an increase in risk leads to higher emissions, the direct and the indirect effects go in the same
direction, and welfare decreases.
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aversion is higher. We show in the next section that this holds more generally. More importantly,
Figure 2 describes how welfare varies with the level of risk. We examine the percentage difference
relative to welfare under certainty. This number is always positive in the simulations, implying
that welfare under uncertainty is greater than under certainty. This shows that Proposition 5 does
not merely follow from the assumption of a small risk. In addition, an increase in catastrophic
risk always leads to an increase in welfare in these simulations. The positive effect of reduced
emissions dominates the negative effect of an increased risk.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
C. Increase in risk aversion
We next study how a change in the level of risk aversion affects emissions. Holding the risk
constant, we look at the effect of an Arrow-Pratt increase in risk aversion. Agents with utility
function v are more risk averse than those with utility u if there exists a function Φ satisfying
Φ0 > 0 and Φ00 ≤ 0 and such that v = Φ(u) (Pratt, 1964). Do more risk averse agents emit less
pollution? Our next result shows that the answer is affirmative. For clarity, we denote here by
eN(u) the emission level at the symmetric equilibrium when agents have utility function u.
Proposition 8. Suppose that agents with utility v are more risk averse than those with utility
u. Then, an increase in risk aversion leads to lower emissions, eN (v) ≤ eN (u).
The intuition behind Proposition 4 applies here as well. Holding others’ emissions constant,
lowering emissions leads to a reduction in the payoff’s variability. Such a reduction is more
and more desirable as risk aversion increases. And while others’ emissions are not fixed and
strategic effects come into play, they are never strong enough to overcome the direct effect. Thus,
emissions in equilibrium decrease if the level of risk aversion increases, which directly generalizes
the benchmark comparison between risk aversion and risk neutrality (Proposition 4). This stands
in contrast with the effect of an increase in risk.20
20As agents become more risk-averse, they might also become more prudent. The previous section suggests that
this could lead to an increase in emissions. Our result shows that this never happens. Here, the negative effect on
emissions due to more risk-aversion is always greater than potentially positive effect due to more prudence.
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IV. Risk Heterogeneity
In this section, we relax the assumption that agents are homogeneous. As we focus on the effect
of uncertainty, we only consider heterogeneity with respect to the level of risk faced. As we will
show, risk heterogeneity has a drastic effect on equilibrium properties and results. To see this,
we simply consider an economy with two agents. One agent faces uncertain damage eθ while the
other agent faces certain damage θ¯ = Eeθ. We especially ask: Which agent is going to emit the
most? Is uncertainty detrimental or an advantage?
Let agent 1 be the agent who faces no risk, and agent 2 the one who faces a risk. We first
show that the equilibrium cannot be interior. Consider the conditions
1− θd0(eN1 + eN2 ) = 0 (IV.1)
E(1− eθd0(eN1 + eN2 ))u0(eN2 − eθd(eN1 + eN2 )) = 0, (IV.2)
where eN1 is the equilibrium level of emissions of agent 1 and e
N
2 that of agent 2. Through (IV.1),
we obtain
E(1− eθd0(eN1 + eN2 ))u0(eN2 − eθd(eN1 + eN2 )) = cov[1− eθd0(eN1 + eN2 ), u0(eN2 − eθd(eN1 + eN2 ))]
This covariance is strictly negative when u is strictly concave, which contradicts (IV.2). This
means that, in equilibrium, one agent must emit no emissions at all. We show that it can only
be agent 2, and that this indeed constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 9. Consider an economy in which agent 1 faces no risk and agent 2 faces a risk.
There is a unique equilibrium in which agent 2 does not emit, and agent 1 emits e which solves
1− θd0(e) = 0.
This result is caused by strong strategic effects. Its intuition may be presented as follows.
Start with a situation where both agents face no uncertainty. Suppose then that agent 2 faces
some degree of uncertainty about his own damage. This leads agent 2 to reduce his emissions,
for a given level of emissions of agent 1. Since emissions are perfect strategic substitutes under
certainty, this leads agent 1 to increase his own emissions. This increase in emissions of agent
1 gives a further incentive to agent 2 to reduce his emissions, and so on. The process continues
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until agent 2 emits no more and agent 1 emits as much as if he were alone in the economy.
Note also that agent 1’s level of emissions is actually equal to the total emissions obtained
in equilibrium under certainty, and that total pollution is the same in the economy. Therefore,
it is immediate that agent 1 is better-off compared to the full certainty case and that agent 2
is worse-off. This raises the question of whether the increase in agent 1’s expected utility may
compensate agent 2’s decrease. That is, how does heterogeneous uncertainty affect welfare in
equilibrium compared to certainty? It is actually easy to see that it always reduces welfare.
Proposition 10. Consider an economy in which agent 1 faces no risk and agent 2 faces a risk.
Then, welfare is lower than when both agents face no risk.
This result suggests that risk never has a positive effect on welfare in this economy, unlike
in the symmetric economy. Notice however that, starting with the same heterogenous economy,
adding a risk to agent 1 can increase welfare. This is the consequence of Proposition 5, which
together with the last Proposition implies that the effect of adding individual risks on welfare
may be non-monotonic.
Finally, we want to contrast non-cooperative and cooperative emissions.21 For the sake of
comparison, social welfare is still defined as the sum of both agents’ expected utilities. Thus, the
cooperative levels of emission solve the following maximization program
max
e1,e2
u(e1 − θd(e1 + e2)) +Eθ˜u(e2 − eθd(e1 + e2))
We find that, under prudence, agent 2 emits more than agent 1 at the optimum. The intuition
for this result is simple. Under prudence, agent 2 values more an extra unit of emissions than
agent 1. Allowing him to emit more is therefore socially efficient.
How does uncertainty affect welfare? Since the objective is concave in the risk variable eθ,
uncertainty clearly reduces aggregate expected utilities compared to the certainty case. We
further question the distribution of this welfare reduction. Does agent 1 end up with more or less
utility than agent 2? The answer depends again on the shape of the utility function. Indeed, we
21Properties of the cooperative solution are throroughly analyzed in our working paper, see Bramoullé and
Treich (2004). In the symmetric case, results on the effects of uncertainty under cooperation are similar to those
obtained under non-cooperation. Especially, cooperative emissions are lower under uncertainty than under certainty.
However, they differ on welfare, the effect of an increase in risk, and heterogenous risks. The last situation is
discussed in this section.
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can show that, under DARA, agent 2 has a higher expected utility than agent 1 at the cooperative
emissions level. The proof relies on the fact that, under DARA, −u0 is more concave than u. As a
result, the increase in emissions that makes agent 2’s marginal utility equal to agent 1’s marginal
utility is larger than the increase in emissions needed to equate both expected utilities. All in all,
these results suggest that, under the usual DARA assumption (which implies prudence), facing
uncertainty may be viewed as an advantage under cooperation.
In this section, we have shown that when agents are heterogeneous in the risk they face, the
impact of uncertainty on individual expected utility goes in opposite directions in the cooperative
and the non-cooperative case. Facing uncertainty is generally beneficial under cooperation. In
contrast, facing uncertainty is always detrimental under non-cooperation. In both cases, uncer-
tainty reduces aggregate expected utility.
V. Extensions
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results to different formulations of the model. Our
global commons model depends on three key variables: individuals’ emissions e, total emissions
(hereafter denoted by) Σ, and a risk parameter θ. Payoffs in a general model can thus be written
v(e,Σ, θ). So far, we have studied the case where v(e,Σ, θ) = u(e − θd(Σ)).22 We now consider
three alternative formulations:
• an additive risk model v(e,Σ, θ) = u(e− d(Σ) + θ)
• an uncertain benefit model v(e,Σ, θ) = u(θe− d(Σ));
• and a two-period model v(e,Σ, θ) = u0(w0+ e)+ u1(w1− θd(Σ)) with u0 and u1 increasing
and concave.
We examine each model in turn, focusing on the comparison between uncertainty and certainty
in the homogenous case. We consider first the simple additive risk model v(e,Σ, θ) = u(e−d(Σ)+
22We observe that many papers in the climate change literature have considered a per period utility of the form
v(e,Σ, θ) = u(e) − θd(Σ); see e.g., Ulph and Ulph (1996), Ulph and Maddison (1997), and Baker (2005). Notice
though that, in this case, uncertainty (unlike learning) has no effect on decisions and payoffs because the utility is
linear in θ.
14
θ). Here, the equilibrium condition under uncertainty writes:
(1− d0(ne))Eθ˜u
0(e− d(ne) + θ˜) = 0.
Since Eθ˜u
0(e − d(ne) + θ˜) is strictly positive, this condition is the same as under certainty:
1 − d0(ne) = 0. The additive risk does not affect emissions. Therefore, there is no positive
indirect effect and uncertainty always has a negative impact on welfare in this economy.
Next, we look at the model with uncertain benefits v(e,Σ, θ) = u(θe−d(Σ)). The equilibrium
condition under uncertainty becomes:
Eθ˜(θ˜ − d
0(ne))u0(θ˜e− d(ne)) = 0.
We analyze this condition in the Appendix, and show that emissions are still lower under un-
certainty than under certainty. The argument behind Proposition 4 essentially extends. When
benefits are uncertain, the payoff variance is still increasing in emissions. Hence, a decrease in
emissions is still desirable under risk-aversion. We also generalize our analysis of small risks
to this case. We obtain a result similar to Proposition 5. For any risk small enough and any
risk-averse utility function, uncertainty has a positive impact on welfare if the damage function
satisfies a simple curvature condition. We check that this condition is indeed satisfied in special
cases. Thus, even with uncertain benefits, uncertainty lowers emissions and may increase welfare.
Finally, we study the two-period model v(e,Σ, θ) = u0(w0 + e) + u1(w1 − θd(Σ)). The equi-
librium condition under uncertainty now becomes:
u00(w0 + e)− d0(ne)Eθ˜θ˜u
0
1(w1 − θ˜d(ne)) = 0.
Interestingly, risk-aversion is not sufficient to sign the effect of uncertainty. We show in the
Appendix that under risk-aversion and prudence, emissions under uncertainty are lower than
under certainty. Prudence appears because in this model decreasing emissions leads to a form
of precautionary savings. This is different from the effect highlighted in section III. In general,
prudence expresses an incentive to secure a higher expected payoff in the period where the risk
is faced. Here, a reduction in payoffs in the first, risk-free period leads to an increase in expected
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payoffs and to a decrease in payoff variance in the second period. Prudence and risk-aversion go in
the same direction. In contrast, there is a unique period in the analysis of section III. Increasing
expected payoffs may be then done by increasing emissions, but at the cost of increasing the
variance. Prudence and risk-aversion go in opposite directions, and risk-aversion often dominates,
as we showed. We generalize the analysis for small risks for the two-period model as well, and
find that welfare may indeed be higher under uncertainty due to the positive effect of reduced
emissions.
Our discussion so far has left aside two important features of global commons problems: the
heterogeneity of impacts and dynamic issues. Would our results be robust to the introduction
of these two features? We informally discuss them in turn. Consider first heterogeneity. As
illustrated in section IV, our model could easily be generalized to account for different benefits,
costs, risks, and levels of risk-aversion. In the presence of heterogeneity, best-response functions
are still lower under uncertainty than under certainty. While a decrease in overall pollution is not
guaranteed any more, it will certainly hold under specific conditions, for instance if heterogeneity
is not too large. And as soon as pollution decreases, welfare may rise. Thus, our results should
extend, under appropriate restrictions, to a setting with heterogeneity.
Dynamic models introduce significant new issues. First, the link between emissions and pol-
lution is more complicated. On the one hand, current emissions have relatively little impact on
current CO2 concentrations. On the other hand, current emissions affect CO2 concentrations in
many future periods. We expect uncertainty to reduce current emissions, as long as emissions
increase the variability of future damages and the discount rate is not too high. Second, uncer-
tainty may affect damages through irreversibilities and thresholds. If anything, serious threats of
irreversible changes should lead countries to increase their efforts to curb emissions, even in the
absence of cooperation. Third, learning takes place over time. Much future research is needed to
precisely understand the effects of uncertainty, learning, and heterogeneity in a dynamic model
of negative externality.
VI. Conclusion
Free-riding and uncertainty are both primary concerns for environmental issues. In this paper,
we develop a simple model with strategic interactions among polluters and where the damage
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from pollution is subject to a multiplicative risk. We find that uncertainty often alleviates the
negative externality. Polluters may lower their emissions to reduce their exposure to risk, which
can increase overall welfare.
Our analysis may have interesting implications for the way economists traditionally view
insurance and risk-sharing institutions. Usually, risk-sharing opportunities operate as a pure risk-
reduction mechanism, which improves welfare under risk-aversion. However, our paper suggests
that this common risk-reduction may lead polluters to increase their emissions, and the net impact
of risk-sharing opportunities that may be made available to polluters can be overall negative. A
policy implication is that it may not be desirable to establish risk-sharing institutions before
addressing a pollution problem.
Our analysis also sheds new light on the effect of uncertainty on the incentives to reach an
agreement. A classical argument is that reaching an agreement may be easier under a “veil of
uncertainty”.23 In this view, cooperation is compared ex ante, before uncertainty is resolved, and
ex post, once uncertainty is resolved. Cooperation is more likely to emerge ex ante, because more
agents potentially gain from the agreement before the uncertainty is resolved. In contrast our
results show that, from an ex ante perspective, cooperation may be less likely under uncertainty.
The reason is that the difference in social welfare between cooperation and non-cooperation may
be lower under uncertainty. This difference exactly measures the collective gain to reach an
agreement.24 Hence, by partly alleviating the commons problem, uncertainty may also reduce
the incentives to fully solve it.
23See Na and Shin (1998) for a formal analysis and Young (1994) for a general discussion.
24Welfare under cooperation drops under uncertainty. Thus, if welfare at equilibrium increases, the difference
between the two decreases.
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Appendix.
The Appendix contains the proofs of all the Propositions in the paper, as well as sketches of
the proofs of statements in sections IV and V. More detailed proofs are available under request.
See also Bramoullé and Treich (2004).
Proof of Proposition 1: An interior symmetric equilibrium always exists.
Introduce f(e, θ) = (1 − θd0(ne))u0(e − θd(ne)) and ϕ(e) = Eθ˜f(e, θ˜). Symmetric equilibria
correspond to the zeros of ϕ. Remember that d0(0) < 1/θ¯ and lime→+∞ d0(e) = +∞. First,
observe that ϕ(0) = (1 − θ¯d0(0))u0(0) > 0. Next we show that ϕ(e) < 0 if e is large enough.
To simplify, suppose that there exists θ such that θ˜ ≥ θ > 0. In that case, we have f(e, θ) ≤
(1− θd0(ne))u0(e− θd(ne)) for any θ, and thus ϕ(e) ≤ (1− θd0(ne))Eu0(e− θ˜d(ne)). Then, notice
that the right hand side of the last expression can be made negative for e large enough. This
argument essentially extends to the case where inf(θ˜) = 0. We can show that for ε small enough
and e large enough, Eθ˜<εf(e, θ˜) is dominated by Eθ˜≥εf(e, θ˜) and ϕ(e) < 0. In the end, continuity
ensures the existence of a zero of ϕ.QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: When u satisfies DARA or IARA, any interior equilibrium is sym-
metric. When u satisfies CARA, asymmetric equilibria exist.
Consider (e∗1, ..., e
∗
n) an interior equilibrium. Introduce e
∗ =
nX
i=1
e∗i , g(e, θ) = (1−θd0(e∗))u0(e−
θd(e∗)), and G(e) = Eθ˜g(e, θ˜). Equilibrium conditions become: ∀i, G(e∗i ) = 0. We will show that
the equationG(e) = 0 cannot have multiple solutions. We first prove the following useful property.
Lemma 1. If u satisfies DARA, then ∀e ≥ 0,∃λ > 0: ∀θ ≥ 0, ∂g∂e (e, θ) ≥ −λg(e, θ) with a strict
inequality except on a single value of θ.
Proof: Introduce θ0 = 1/d0(e∗) and λ = A(e − θ0d(e∗)) where A(π) = −u00(π)/u0(π). If θ >
θ0, then 1 − θd0(e∗) < 0 and A(e − θd(e∗)) > λ since A is decreasing and d(e∗) > 0. Thus,
u00(e−θd(e∗)) < −λu0(e−θd(e∗)) and (1−θd0(e∗))u00(e−θd(e∗)) > −λ(1−θd0(e∗))u0(e−θd(e∗)). If
θ < θ0, then (1−θd0(e∗)) > 0 and A(e−θd(e∗)) < λ. This yields u00(e−θd(e∗)) > −λu0(e−θd(e∗))
and, again, (1− θd0(e∗))u00(e− θd(e∗)) > −λ(1− θd0(e∗))u0(e− θd(e∗)). This means that for any
θ 6= θ0, ∂g∂e (e, θ) > −λϕ(e, θ), while equality holds at θ = θ0. ¤
Next, we apply the diffidence theorem to function g, see Gollier (2001, p. 83). The previous
lemma implies that Eθ˜g(e, θ˜) = 0 ⇒ Eθ˜
∂g
∂e (e, θ˜) > 0. Thus, G(e) = 0 ⇒ G0(e) > 0. This is
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a standard single-crossing property. It says that the function G can only cross the horizontal
axis from below, and ensures that it cannot cross it more than once. Therefore, any interior
equilibrium is symmetric under DARA. When u satisfies IARA, the previous reasoning can easily
be adapted to show that G(e) = 0 ⇒ G0(e) < 0. Function G can only cross the horizontal axis
from above, which also guarantees that the equation G(e) = 0 cannot have multiple solutions.
Finally, suppose that u satisfies CARA, u(π) = −e−Aπ and let (e1, ..., en) be a profile such that
nX
i=1
ei = e∗. Equilibrium conditions become: ∀i, Eθ˜(1− θ˜d0(e∗))e−A(e
∗
i−θ˜d(e∗)) = 0. Multiplying by
e−A(ei−e
∗
i ), we obtain: ∀i, Eθ˜(1− θ˜d0(
Pn
i=1 ei))e
−A(ei−θ˜d(
?n
i=1 ei)) = 0, which shows that (e1, ..., en)
is also an equilibrium. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: When u satisfies DARA or CARA, there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium.
A symmetric equilibrium where everyone emits e is characterized by the equation ϕ(e) = 0.
We will show that this equation cannot have multiple solutions. As in the previous proof, we
will rely on the diffidence theorem to show a single-crossing property. Omitting arguments for
clarity, we have: ∂f∂e = −nθd00u0 + (1 − θd0)(1 − nθd0)u00. Introduce h = (1 − θd0)(1 − nθd0)u00
and θ∗ = 1/d0(ne). Observe that f(e, θ∗) = h(e, θ∗) = 0. We wish to apply Corollary 1 in
Golllier (2001, p. 86) to f and h. We want to show that ∀θ, h(e, θ) ≤
∂h
∂θ (e,θ
∗)
∂f
∂θ (e,θ
∗)
f(e, θ). Here,
∂f
∂θ (e, θ
∗) = −d0(ne)u0(e−θ∗d(ne)) 6= 0 and ∂h∂θ (e, θ∗) = −(n−1)∂f∂θ (e, θ∗). The previous inequality
is equivalent to
(1− θd0)(1− n)A(e− d/d0) ≤ (1− θd0)(1− nθd0)A(e− θd)
Suppose first that u satisfies CARA. A is constant and this inequality reduces to −(1 −
θd0)2nA ≤ 0, which is always satisfied. Suppose next that u satisfies DARA, that is A is decreas-
ing. Consider 3 cases. (1) If θ ≥ θ∗, then A(e − θd) ≥ A(e − d/d0) and (1 − θd0)(1− nθd0) ≥ 0.
Then, (1− θd0)(1−nθd0)A(e− θd) ≥ (1− θd0)(1−nθd0)A(e− d/d0) ≥ (1− θd0)(1−n)A(e− d/d0)
where the second inequality comes from the result on CARA functions. (2) If θ∗ ≥ θ ≥ 1nθ
∗,
then A(e− θd) ≤ A(e− d/d0) and (1− θd0)(1− nθd0) ≤ 0, hence (1− θd0)(1− nθd0)A(e− θd) ≥
(1− θd0)(1−n)A(e− d/d0) for the same reason. (3) If 1nθ
∗ > θ, then 1− θd0 > 0 and 1−nθd0 > 0
but 1− n < 0, hence the inequality is satisfied.
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Thus, under CARA or DARA, we can conclude that ϕ(e) = Eθ˜f(e, θ˜) = 0 ⇒ Eθ˜h(e, θ˜) ≤
0⇒ ϕ0(e) = Eθ˜
∂f
∂e (e, θ˜) < 0. This is a similar single-crossing condition as the one obtained in the
previous proof. It means that ϕ can only cross the horizontal axis once. Hence the symmetric
equilibrium is unique. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4: Emissions under uncertainty are lower than under certainty: eN ≤ e¯N .
We make use of the following covariance rule, see Kimball (1951) or Gollier (2001, p. 94).
If X(θ) is non-increasing in θ and Y (θ) is non-decreasing in θ, then covθ˜(X(θ˜), Y (θ˜)) ≤ 0. In-
troduce X(θ) = 1 − θd0(neN ) and Y (θ) = u0(eN − θd(neN)). X is clearly non-increasing, and
Y is non-decreasing by concavity of u. This implies that covθ˜(X(θ˜), Y (θ˜)) ≤ 0. We have:
covθ˜(X(θ˜), Y (θ˜)) = EX(θ˜)Y (θ˜)−EX(θ˜)EY (θ˜). Then, EX(θ˜)Y (θ˜) = ϕ(eN) = 0 and EY (θ˜) > 0.
Therefore EX(θ˜) = 1 − θ¯d0(neN) ≥ 0. Since the function 1 − θ¯d0(ne) is non-increasing in e and
1− θ¯d0(neN ) = 0, we obtain eN ≤ eN . QED.
Proof of Proposition 5: If Id > (<)− n−2n and the risk is small enough, uncertainty increases
(decreases) welfare compared to certainty, W (eN ) > (<)W¯ (e¯N).
Denote by e(k) the level of emissions at the symmetric equilibrium, by W (k) the level of
welfare and by V the variance of ε˜. Note that e(0) = eN and ∂θ˜∂k = ε˜. Deriving condition (II.2)
with respect to k yields: e0(k)E ∂f∂e (e(k), θ˜) + Eε˜
∂f
∂θ (e(k), θ˜) = 0. Omitting arguments for clarity,
we get: ∂f∂e = −nθd00u0 + (1 − θd0)(1 − nθd0)u00 and
∂f
∂θ = −d0u0 − d(1 − θd0)u00. At k = 0, this
reduces to E ∂f∂e = −nθ¯d00u0 < 0 and Eε˜
∂f
∂θ = 0. Therefore, e
0(0) = 0. Deriving a second time, we
obtain: e00(k)E ∂f∂e (e(k), θ˜) + e
0(k)(.) + Eε˜2 ∂
2f
∂θ2
(e(k), θ˜) = 0. Since ∂
2f
∂θ2
= 2dd0u00 + d2(1− θd0)u000,
we have Eε˜2 ∂
2f
∂θ2
= 2dd0u00V at k = 0. This means that
e00(0) =
2dd0u00V
nθ¯d00u0
The fact that e00(0) < 0 is consistent with Proposition 4. Emissions for small risks are lower
than for no risk. Next, derive W with respect to k. Denote by g(e, θ) = u(e− θd(ne)). W 0(k) =
e0(k)E ∂g∂e (e(k), θ˜) + Eε˜
∂g
∂θ (e(k), θ˜). Here,
∂g
∂e = (1− nθd0)u0 and
∂g
∂θ = −du0. At k = 0, we obtain,
again,W 0(0) = 0. Deriving a second time,W 00(k) = e00(k)E ∂g∂e (e(k), θ˜)+e
0(k)(.)+Eε˜2 ∂
2g
∂θ2
(e(k), θ˜).
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Since ∂
2g
∂θ2
= d2u00, this implies
W 00(0) = −e00(0)(n− 1)u0 + d2u00V
We see, again, the two effects. The first term on the right hand side captures the positive
strategic effect of a reduction in emissions on welfare. The second term is negative due to risk
aversion. Substituting the expression for e00(0) leads to W 00(0) = (−u00)V dd02d00 (Id +
n−2
n ). A
Taylor approximation of W around 0 yields W (k) ≈ W (0) + 12k2W 00(0) + o(k2). If W 00(0) > 0,
W (k) > W (0) if k is small enough, while if W 00(0) < 0, W (k) < W (0) if k is small enough. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider an increase in risk from θ˜ to z˜. Suppose that u000 = 0. Then,
for any damage function d, an increase in risk leads to lower emissions, eN(z˜) ≤ eN (θ˜).
Since z˜ corresponds to an increase in risk from θ˜, for any concave function ψ, Eψ(z˜) ≤ Eψ(θ˜).
If f(e, θ) is concave in θ, then ϕ(e, z˜) ≤ ϕ(e, θ˜). We have:
∂2f
∂θ2
= 2d(ne)d0(ne)u00(e− θd(ne)) + d2(ne)(1− θd0(ne))u000(e− θd(ne))
hence ∂
2f
∂θ2
≤ 0 and f concave if u000 = 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 7: For any utility function u and damage function d, an increase in
catastrophic risk leads to lower emissions.
Introduce πL = e− θLd(ne) and πH = e− (θL + k(θ − θL))d(ne). Condition II.2 becomes:
(1− 1
k
)(1− θLd0(ne))u0(πL) +
1
k
(1− (θL + k(θ − θL)d0(ne))u0(πH) = 0
Define ψ(e, k) = (k − 1)(1− θLd0(ne))u0(πL) + (1− (θL + k(θ − θL)d0(ne))u0(πH). It is sufficient
to show that ψ is non-increasing in k. After some simplifications, we obtain
∂ψ
∂k
=
u0(πH)
1− k (1− θd
0(ne))− (1− (θL + k(θ − θL)d0(ne))(θ − θL)d(ne)u00(πH)
Since k > 1 and 1 − θd0(ne) ≥ 0, the first term is negative. Also, θ > θL implies that 1 −
θLnd0(ne) > 0, and, by condition II.2, (1− (θL+k(θ− θL)d0(ne) < 0. Therefore, the second term
is negative as well, hence ∂ψ∂k < 0. QED.
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Proof of Proposition 8: Suppose that agents with utility v are more risk averse than those
with utility u. Then, an increase in risk aversion leads to lower emissions, eN (v) ≤ eN(u).
Recall, ϕ(e, u) = Eθ˜(1− θ˜d0(ne))u0(e− θ˜d(ne)). We will show that ϕ(eN(u), v) ≤ 0. Consider
a specific value of θ. Either 1− θd0(ne) ≤ 0, hence e− θd(ne) ≤ e− d(ne)d0(ne) and Φ0[u(e− θd(ne))] ≥
Φ0[u(e− d(ne)nd0(ne))] since u is increasing and Φ0 is decreasing. This implies that
[1− θd0(ne)]Φ0[u(e− θd(ne))] ≤ [1− θd0(ne)]Φ0[u(e− d(ne)
d0(ne)
)]
Or 1 − θd0(ne) ≥ 0, and Φ0[u(e − θd(ne))] ≤ Φ0[u(e − d(ne)nd0(ne))] which yields the same inequality
as above. Since this inequality is valid for any θ, we multiply by u0(e − θd(ne)) and take the
expectation. This yields
ϕ(e, v) ≤ Φ0[u(e− d(ne)
d0(ne)
)]ϕ(e, u)
At e = eN(u), this reduces to ϕ(eN (u), v) ≤ 0. Since ϕ(e, v) starts above the horizontal axis, and
crosses it only once at eN (v), we must have eN (v) ≤ eN (u). QED.
Proof of Proposition 9: Consider an economy in which agent 1 faces no risk and agent 2 faces
a risk. There is a unique equilibrium in which agent 2 does not emit, and agent 1 emits e which
solves 1− θd0(e) = 0.
Assume first that agent 1 does not emit, eN1 = 0. Then agent 2 chooses e
N
2 such that
E(1− eθd0(eN2 ))u0(eN2 − eθd(eN2 )) = 0 (VI.1)
To examine whether this can be an equilibrium let us examine agent 1’s best response. Agent 1
then simply chooses e1 to maximize u(e1 − θd(e1 + eN2 )) where eN2 is characterized by VI.1. So
eN1 = 0 would be a best-response if and only if
1− θd0(eN2 ) ≤ 0. (VI.2)
Yet E(1− eθd0(eN2 ))u0(eN2 − eθd(eN2 )) is equal to
covθ˜[1− eθd0(eN2 ), u0(eN2 − eθd(eN2 ))] +E(1− eθd0(eN2 ))Eu0(eN2 − eθd(eN2 ))
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which is strictly negative under u0 strictly decreasing and VI.2. This contradicts VI.1. As a result,
there is no equilibrium with eN1 = 0. Let us finally assume that the agent facing uncertainty does
not emit at all, eN2 = 0. In that case, agent 1 chooses e
N
1 such that
1− θd0(eN1 ) = 0 (VI.3)
Agent 2 then chooses e2 to maximizeWN (e2) ≡ Eu(e2−eθd(eN1 +e2)) where eN1 is characterized by
VI.3. Since WN is concave, a necessary and sufficient condition for eN2 = 0 to be a best response
consists in showing that W 0N (0) ≤ 0. We get
W 0N(0) = E(1− eθd0(eN1 ))u0(0− eθd(eN1 )) = covθ˜[1− eθd0(eN1 ), u0(0− eθd(eN1 )]
which is indeed negative under u0 strictly decreasing. QED.
Proof of Proposition 10: Consider an economy in which agent 1 faces no risk and agent 2
faces a risk. Then, welfare is lower than when both agents face no risk.
Let e be the level of emissions of agent 1 at the Nash equilibrium, which satisfies 1−θd0(e) = 0.
Welfare in equilibrium equals u(e−θd(e))+Eu(0−eθd(e)). Under risk aversion, this is lower than
u(e− θd(e)) + u(0− θd(e)) which is itself lower than 2u(12e− θd(e)) by Jensen’s inequality. This
last quantity is simply the aggregate expected utility that is reached at the symmetric equilibrium
under certainty. QED.
Proof of statements in Section IV: We first show that agent 2 emits more than agent 1 in
the cooperative case. We denote (eC1 , e
C
2 ) the cooperative solution to
max
e1,e2
u(e1 − θd(e1 + e2)) +Eθ˜u(e2 − eθd(e1 + e2))
After simple manipulations, the condition for an interior cooperative solution (eC1 , e
C
2 ) may be
written
u0(eC1 − θd(eC1 + eC2 )) = Eθ˜u
0(eC2 − eθd(eC1 + eC2 )),
which is the standard equalization of expected marginal utilities. Observe that if the marginal
utility is convex, Eθ˜u
0(e2−eθd(e1+e2)) ≥ u0(e2−θd(e1+e2)) for any e1, e2. Hence under prudence,
23
we obtain that agent 2 emits more than agent 1 at the optimum. It can be easily shown that this
result holds as well for corner solutions. Namely suppose that one of the two agents emits zero
emissions, eCi = 0. Then, when u
000 > 0, it must be agent i = 1.
We now show that, under DARA, the expected utility of agent 2 is higher than that of agent
1. If u is DARA, there exists T increasing and convex such that is u = T (−u0). This implies that
u(eC1 − θd(eC1 + eC2 )) which is equal to T (−u0(eC1 − θd(eC1 + eC2 ))) or T (−Eu0(eC2 − eθd(eC1 + eC2 )))
is lower than E(T (−u0(eC2 − eθd(eC1 + eC2 )), and so is lower than Eu(eC2 − eθd(eC1 + eC2 )).
Proofs of statements in Section V: We first consider the model with uncertain benefits.
Denote by e the level of emissions under certainty, solving θ − d0(ne) = 0. We see that: E(θ˜ −
d0(ne))u0(θ˜e − d(ne)) = Cov(θ˜ − d0(ne), u0(θ˜e − d(ne))) ≤ 0, by the definition of covariance
and the covariance rule. This implies that emissions under uncertainty are lower than under
certainty. Next, introduce θ˜ = θ¯ + kε˜. Following the same methodology as in the proof of
Proposition 5, we can show that e0(0) =W 0(0) = 0 and W 00(0) = 2(n−1)n (−u00)V e(0)[
d0
d00 −
n
2(n−1) ].
Uncertainty improves welfare for small risks if d0/d00 > n/(2(n−1)). This is satisfied, for instance,
if d(e) = C(exp(De)− 1) and D < 2(n− 1)/n.
We now consider the model with two periods. Without loss of generality, suppose that
w0 = w1 = 0, and denote again by e the level of emissions under certainty. It now solves
u00(e)−d0(ne)θu01(−θd(ne)) = 0. We have: u00(e)−d0(ne)Eθ˜u01(−θ˜d(ne)) = d0(ne)[θu01(−θd(ne))−
Eθ˜u01(−θ˜d(ne))] = d0(ne)[θu01(−θd(ne))− θEu01(−θ˜d(ne))− Cov(θ˜, u01(−θ˜d(ne)))]. Then,
Cov(θ˜, u01(−θ˜d(ne))) ≥ 0 by the covariance rule. In addition, Eu01(−θ˜d(ne)) ≥ u01(−θd(ne)) if
u01 convex. Thus, u00(e)−d0(ne)Eθ˜u01(−θ˜d(ne)) ≤ 0 under prudence, which implies that emissions
under uncertainty are lower than under certainty. The analysis of small risks yields, again,
that e0(0) = W 0(0) = 0. The expression for W 00(0) is more complicated. Omitting arguments
for clarity, we find that W 00(0) = (n − 1)V θdd02 −2u
00
1+θdu
000
1
nθd00u01−nθ
2
d02u001−u000
+ V d2u001. The first term
corresponds to the indirect effect of changed emissions, and is positive under prudence. The
second term captures the direct, negative effect of uncertainty. For example when u satisfies
CARA and d(e) = De, we can see that a symmetric equilibrium exists, and uncertainty improves
welfare if D small enough.
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Table 1. Effect of greenhouse gas concentration on global mean 
temperature increase. 
 
Reproduces the findings of different studies on the equilibrium temperature projections for 
different levels of greenhouse gas concentration using 5%-95% climate sensitivity ranges, see 
Table 1.1. in Stern et al. (2007, p. 12) for details and references. 
 
 
Temperature increase at equilibrium relative to pre-industrial (°C) Stabilisation level 
(ppm CO2 equivalent) 
 IPCC TAR 2001 Hadley Centre  Eleven Studies 
400 0.8 - 2.4 1.3 - 2.8 0.6 - 4.9 
450 1.0 - 3.1 1.7 - 3.7 0.8 - 6.4 
500 1.3 - 3.8 2.0 - 4.5 1.0 - 7.9 
550 1.5 - 4.4 2.4 - 5.3 1.2 - 9.1 
650 1.8 - 5.5 2.9 - 6.6 1.5 - 11.4 
750 2.2 - 6.4 3.4 - 7.7 1.7 - 13.3 
1000 2.8 - 8.3 4.4 - 9.9 2.2 - 17.1 
 
Figure 1. Increase in catastrophic risk and emissions
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Figure 2. Increase in catastrophic risk and welfare
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